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How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency*	
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This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Ethics. Please contact one
of us if you wish to cite it.
Abstract: We argue that a number of difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the FregeGeach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic
theories. We argue that a prominent realist solution to the problem of explaining logical
inconsistency can be adopted by expressivists. By doing so, the expressivist brings her
account of logical consequence more in line with philosophical orthodoxy, while
simultaneously purchasing herself the right to appeal to a wider class of attitudinal conflicts in
her semantic theorizing than is allowed, for instance, by Mark Schroeder in his recent work.
Finally, it emerges that a standard objection to expressivist theories is based on a
misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem. We explain this misinterpretation and show
how expressivists can easily skirt the objection it motivates.	
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Odi et amo. quare id faciam, fortasse requiris?
nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior.1
Catullus 85

1. Introduction

Our evaluations, credences, preferences, goals, and of course our beliefs are often
inconsistent. Sometimes we can explain this inconsistency by means of some feature of the
content of the attitudes. Beliefs are inconsistent when what is believed is logically or
semantically inconsistent.2 It is, however, not obvious that all inconsistency of attitude can be
explained in this way.
Many theorists have introduced an unreduced notion of inconsistency of attitude to
account for how non-cognitive attitudes can be inconsistent with one another.3 They then
appeal to this notion in developing expressivist semantics, using inconsistency of attitude to
explain various forms of linguistic inconsistency, including the inconsistency that exists
between logically contradictory statements like ‘Murder is wrong’ and ‘Murder is not wrong’.
In other words, an unreduced notion of inconsistency of attitude is a key element in their
solutions to the Frege-Geach problem—in its most general form, the problem of developing a
compositional semantics for an attitude-expressing language.
We view this strategy as promising, whatever the fate of particular instances of it. But
recently Mark Schroeder has argued that expressivists may appeal only to inconsistencies of
attitude that are themselves explained by the semantic inconsistency of their contents—

1 Roughly: “I hate and I love. How do I do that, perhaps you ask?
I do not know, but I feel it happen and I am torn apart.”
2 There is a difficult issue about how much logical structure is built into propositions and whether the logical
relations between propositions are inherited from their vehicles of expression. This issue will come up
repeatedly.
3 For example, see Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Oxford University Press, 1984);
Alan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1990), and Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2003).
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beliefs being the paradigm case—if they are to solve the Frege-Geach problem.4 Call such
inconsistency of attitude A-type. Nick Zangwill and Mark van Roojen raise similar worries.5
Schroeder is concerned that more expansive notions of attitudinal inconsistency are
theoretically obscure; all three are concerned that expressivists will be forced to conflate
logical and non-logical forms of inconsistency. This objection is misguided. If expressivism
fails, it fails because it is extensionally inadequate. If an extensionally adequate form of
expressivism is available, there is no cogent objection that it appeals to an unreduced notion
of inconsistency of attitude.
We will show that cases of non-A-type inconsistency are ubiquitous and are no less
amenable to explanation than A-type (section 2). Any of these types of inconsistency of
attitude can serve as a perfectly respectable explanans. We will then argue that the
expressivist should view logical properties as properties of sentences6 and only derivatively
as properties of attitudes (section 3). This parallels the standard understanding of the nature
of logical consequence. It follows from this discussion that many objections to expressivism
rest on a mistaken interpretation of the Frege-Geach problem—as a demand that the
expressivist provide a psychologistic explanation of logic. This the expressivist need not and
should not do. These points jointly underwrite a promising style of solution to the FregeGeach problem.
We do not aim to offer an expressivist semantics here, but to show that expressivists
have sufficiently more theoretical resources than is often thought. It has been overlooked that
expressivists can appeal to features of the vehicle of expression of moral judgments—such as

4 See his Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), and Noncognitivism in Ethics (New York: Routledge, 2010).
5 Nick Zangwill, “Moral Modus Ponens,” Ratio (New Series) 2 (1992): 177-93; and Mark van Roojen,
“Expressivism and Irrationality,” The Philosophical Review 105 (1996): 311-35.
6 It would be more accurate to say “interpreted sentences,” but it would also be potentially misleading, as the
sense in which they are interpreted falls far short of a full account of their meaning. The sense of
interpretation will be made clear in fn. 79.
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syntactic properties of normative language and a designated class of privileged expressions—
as part of their solution to the Frege-Geach problem. Far from being some theoretically
desperate maneuver, this appeal to, say, the syntactic properties of normative language brings
expressivist solutions to Frege-Geach in line with the orthodox understanding of logicality. In
fact, a number of the difficulties thought to face expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach
seem to presuppose an understanding of logic entirely idiosyncratic to discussion of
expressivism. In the next section we provide an overview of how we understand the debate
between realism and expressivism, the basic theoretical resources open to both, and an
outline of the argument that will run throughout the paper. This outline will show that the
defenses we offer on behalf of expressivism almost exactly parallel the defenses a realist
should give if faced with similar objections. This in place, we will move to the specific
objections of Schroeder, van Roojen, and Zangwill.
Readers have probably noticed at this point that there are at least four notions of
inconsistency at work—semantic, logical, metaphysical, and attitudinal inconsistency. To
prevent confusion, we will call attitudes discordant when they are inconsistent. This is a term
of art, and is not meant to indicate anything other than that the set of attitudes have a property
that is often called ‘inconsistency’. We will present reasons in subsequent sections to think
this is a real property and its instances make up a unified theoretical kind. The other three
forms of inconsistency will continue to bear the name ‘inconsistency’ as they make up a
family, at least within this discussion: they are all properties of sets of sentences or
propositions, are all connected with truth and falsity, contradiction, incompatibility, and
impossibility in much the same way. We will argue that none of logical, semantic, or
metaphysical inconsistency is a necessary or sufficient condition on discordance of attitude—
and so discordance, having no essential connection to truth or contradiction, will have its own
name. When engagement with the literature forces us to call attitudes ‘inconsistent’, the word
4

will appear in angled brackets like so <inconsistent>.

1.1. Overview of the Argument

Let’s start with two sample sentences, p and ~p, and assume that p is normative: it tells us
that murder is wrong, that perseverance is admirable, or that Guns N’ Roses, however
overwrought some of their songs might be, is on the whole a good band. ~p denies the same.
Here are the three starting data points that everyone should agree to:7
1.

p and ~p are inconsistent sentences.

2.

p is true if and only if ~p is false and p is false if and only if ~p is true.

3.

A set of sentences is inconsistent if and only if its members cannot be jointly
true.

3 establishes a connection between truth and inconsistency. The debate between the realist
and expressivist can be profitably understood in terms of a Euthyphro problem regarding that
connection. Are the sentences inconsistent because they cannot all be true, or must at least
one of the sentences be false because they are inconsistent?8 Does 1 explain 2, or does 2
explain 1?
For the typical realist, the sentence denotes a proposition, and, necessarily, the
proposition denoted by p is true if and only if the proposition denoted by ~p is false. This
explains the truth of 2; and 2, combined with 3, explains 1. This explanation may seem
straightforward enough, but keep in mind that in giving it the realist has taken on large
theoretical burdens, and much about this explanation remains telegraphic. The explanation

7 We bracket those benighted few who think that sentences such as p will not be truth-apt. Expressivists
typically have and should accept that normative sentences can be true or false in at least a minimalist sense
of truth and falsity.
8 Some of these points are inspired by Zangwill’s outline of the realist-expressivist debate in “Noncognitivism and Consistency,” Zeitschrift für die philosophische Forschung 65 (2011): 465-84.
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relies on propositions (theoretical posits), and necessary connections between distinct
propositional objects. There must also be necessary connections between the truth of
propositions and concrete objects in the world and a story about our epistemic access to them.
Explanations have been offered, such as identifying propositions with structured
wholes of objects and properties or with sets of possible worlds. But these explanations come
with problems of their own—the unity of the proposition or the nature of possible worlds, for
example. These problems are hardly decisive; rather they set the stage for further research
programs. We mention them not to criticize, but rather because what the realist can say in
response to such problems shows what an expressivist should say in response to analogous
objections.
Appeal to propositions and truth can be explanatory, despite the obscurity of the
explanans. Most agree that sentences have meanings and, philosophical difficulties aside, we
all have a sense of what it is for a claim to be true or false. We are familiar with these notions,
know how to apply them, and find ourselves generally in agreement about which claims are
true and what they mean. So they can serve in acceptable and informative explanations, even
if a theoretically satisfying account of their nature remains elusive.
There is a more serious difficulty for the realist if she wishes to explain inconsistency
in terms of truth: at first glance, she has no way of distinguishing logical inconsistency from
metaphysical inconsistency. The truth of ‘X is water’ is just as incompatible with the truth of
‘X is not H2O’ as with that of ‘X is not water’. We need something other than truth, then, to
capture the fact that only the latter sentence is logically inconsistent with the first. The most
obvious explanation is that one can know that ‘X is water’ and ‘X is not water’ have
incompatible truth values solely by knowing the meaning of the word ‘not’. Knowing that ‘X
is water’ and ‘X is not H2O’ are inconsistent, by contrast, requires that one know that ‘water’
and ‘H2O’ denote the same property. Generalizing on this, the realist can distinguish logical
6

inconsistency as inconsistency in virtue of some privileged subset of the vocabulary.
This cleaves to the almost universally held picture of the nature of logical relations—
that they are formal relations. Tarski’s approach—by far the dominant orthodox conception
of logical consequence and logical truth—designates a subclass of the analytic truths as
logical truths—namely, those which are analytic by virtue of the meaning of a designated
vocabulary.9 The dominant unorthodox account of logical consequence and logical truth
holds, by contrast, that logical truths are that subclass of necessary truths that can be
identified by means of syntactically defined proof rules;10 mutatis mutandis for logical
consequence. In short, the standard accounts in the philosophy of logic make logical
properties primarily properties of sentences. They explain logicality in terms of syntax and a
designated class of expressions, and so logical properties will depend essentially on being
related to a syntax.11
The realist admittedly has another option for explaining logical inconsistency: she can
appeal to fine-grained propositions that are composed out of concepts. These concepts can
then either be identified with Fregean senses—this is effectively to stipulate that they have
the properties needed for our semantic theory—or individuated by something like inferential
role.12 But we think the direct syntactic account is the most promising: it easily captures the
standard commitment that logic is formal. And in any case, it is the account that could be
most easily adapted to expressivism.13
These points about realism help better clarify the explanatory burdens of the

9 Alfred Tarski, “On the Concept of Following Logically,” History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (2002): 155-96.
10 Stephen Read, “Formal and Material Consequence,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1994): 247-65.
11 Note that this does not exclude the possibility of propositions with logical properties—so long as such finegrained propositions are partially individuated by their relations to sentences; see for example David Lewis,
“General Semantics,” Synthese 22 (1970): 12-67; and Jeffrey C. King, The Nature and Structure of Content
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
12 Identifying concepts as lexical items in a language of thought will just lead to a special case of the syntactic
account of logic considered above.
13 We will not address in more detail this Fregean alternative, except to note that all of our discussion of logical
inconsistency could be modified in terms of the analogue of syntactical structure captured by the Fregean
account of propositions.
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expressivist. As Zangwill points out, expressivism can be seen as reversing the order of the
realist’s explanations, putting inconsistency first.14 On our picture, it explains 2 in terms of 1
and 3. p is true if and only if ~p is false because p and ~p are inconsistent, and inconsistent
sentences cannot be jointly true.15 So what explains their inconsistency? The expressivist sees
the primary role of normative language in its communicative purpose. The sentences are
inconsistent because, say, they would fail to communicate if the same speaker uttered both;
and they would fail to communicate because the attitudes expressed by the two sentences are
discordant.16
The first explanatory burden of the expressivist, then, is to demonstrate that we have
intuitive familiarity with discordance of attitude. This parallels the realists’ appeals to
meaning (cashed out using propositions) and truth as intuitively familiar. In section 2, we
show—contra Schroeder—many of the cases of discordance with which we are familiar are
not what he calls A-type. We address Schroeder’s complaint that it is difficult to explain nonA-type discordance, pointing out that it is difficult for everyone to explain discordance. We
then show that the two explanations of attitudinal discordance (e.g. discordance of beliefs
with semantically inconsistent contents) offered in the literature are clearly compatible with
the existence of non-A-type discordance.
The other burden is to account for logical inconsistency. This will only be done in
part. We will address the objection that non-A-type forms of discordance, while they may be
familiar enough, are not logical, or too ubiquitous to ground logicality, and hence they are the
wrong type to appeal to for solving the Frege-Geach problem. This objection, we will argue

14 Zangwill, “Non-cognitivism and Inconsistency.”
15 This explanation requires a completeness assumption guaranteeing that at least one of p and ~p is true.
16 Zangwill, ibid., argues that an expressivist will be forced to accept cognitivism about the norm of attitudinal
<consistency>. We disagree, but addressing this objection is outside of the scope of this paper.
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in section 3, rests on a mistaken interpretation of the Frege-Geach problem.17
The key to this argument is to remember that while a realist can explain the
distinction between logical and non-logical inconsistency in terms of the logical properties of
propositions, she need not. It is acceptable that propositions always be inconsistent in some
generic, non-logical sense (metaphysically or semantically)—so long as we can sometimes
identify that inconsistency in virtue of a restricted class of syntactic facts about the sentences
denoting those propositions. Rather than try to identify an especially logic-like form of
psychological conflict to ground logical properties, the expressivist should claim that
attitudes, when discordant, are always discordant in some generic, non-logical sense, and
insist on an explanation of logicality essentially involving the syntactic features of their
vehicle of expression.18

2. Schroeder’s Argument against B-type Discordance

As we’ve said, expressivists will hold that the sentences ‘murder is wrong’ and ‘murder is not
wrong’ are inconsistent because they express discordant attitudes. Schroeder gives two ways
that attitudes might be discordant:19

17 Readers interested in the history of this problem should see G.F. Schueler, “Modus Ponens and Moral
Realism,” Ethics 98 (1988): 392–500; and Crispin Wright “Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-realism,”
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 25–49. Both object that Blackburn’s account of modus ponens
conflates moral failings with logical ones. For summary and discussion of this objection see Alexander
Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003): Chapter 4.
18 See Nate Charlow, “The Problem with the Frege-Geach Problem,” Philosophical Studies, 167 (2014): 635665 for a different way for expressivists to avoid commitment to a psychologistic semantics.
19 Being For, 48.
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A-type discordance A set of attitudes is A-type discordant if and only if the set of
attitudes is discordant in virtue of being a set of attitudes of the same type with
inconsistent contents.
	
  

B-type discordance A set of attitudes is B-type discordant if and only if the set of
attitudes is discordant but not in virtue of being a set of attitudes of the same type with
inconsistent contents.
	
  

Beliefs are offered as a paradigm case of A-type discordance, and Schroeder cites approval
and disapproval as attitudes which have been thought to be capable of B-type discordance.
We should note that our definition of B-type discordance differs slightly from Schroeder’s.
Schroeder describes B-Type <inconsistency> as a case of holding “two distinct and
apparently logically unrelated attitudes toward the same content” [emphasis in original].20
Note that on this definition, the two types of discordance Schroeder identifies are not
exhaustive. We will use our definition, then, since our goal is to establish that Schroeder is
incorrect when he says, as he does, that A-type discordance is the only type.
Restricting discordance to cases of A-type discordance turns out to have devastating
consequences for expressivism. Consider the sentence ‘Jack is not poor.’ This assertion
presumably expresses a belief. But it is logically inconsistent with ‘Everyone is either wicked
or poor, but Jack is not wicked’ which uses normative vocabulary.21 For the (pure)
expressivist, sentences with normative content express, when asserted, conative rather than
cognitive attitudes. But sentences are inconsistent only if the attitudes they express are
discordant. And to be discordant, according to Schroeder, attitudes must be A-type discordant,

20 Ibid.
21 This style of example is familiar from Arthur Prior “The Autonomy of Ethics,” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 38 (1960): 199-206.

10

and so of the same type. It follows that belief is really a type of non-cognitive attitude.
Schroeder goes on, almost heroically, to develop a theory compatible with this conclusion.
But, as he acknowledges, many people will “conclude this amounts to a reductio of
expressivism.”22
Schroeder’s point is one about acceptable ideology. Assuming the existence of A-type
discordance is “respectable,” according to Schroeder, “[u]nlike the assumption of brute Btype inconsistency, for which there are no good models…”23 Schroeder’s justification for
restricting our ideology is, unfortunately, never given a clear statement. Two basic concerns
emerge in his discussion: A-type discordance seems like it could be explained in terms of
semantic inconsistency of contents, which is somewhat understood, whereas B-type seems
like it could not; and as there are familiar cases of A-type discordance, but no familiar cases
of B-type, the latter is theoretically exotic. However, as we will now show, no cogent
objection can be constructed out of either concern.

2.1. Lack of an Explanation

Schroeder at several points indicates that there is an explanatory asymmetry between A-type
and B-type discordance. He writes about B-type discordance:

Let me be clear that we can do things this way. …But once we do things in this way, it should
be very clear that we have left completely unexplained and apparently inexplicable why
‘murder is wrong’ and ‘murder is not wrong’ are inconsistent.24
	
  

22 Being For, 92-3.
23 Ibid., 59.
24 Ibid., 47.
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And:

All of the paradigm cases of inconsistency between mental states are cases of bearing the
same attitude toward inconsistent contents. …An explanation that appeals to such materials is
respectable, in the sense that it appeals to the kinds of assumption that it is reasonable for
expressivists to hope to be able to explain.25
	
  

So the problem with B-type discordance might be that we cannot explain why attitudes of
different types, or attitudes with logically consistent contents, would conflict with each other.
Expressivists need to provide such an explanation before they can appeal to B-type
discordance in their semantic theories, otherwise they are “essentially helping [themselves] to
the very thing… that expressivists need to explain.”26
Now obviously a theory should aim to explain as many of its important concepts as
possible. But just as obviously, any theory must appeal to some unexplained notions—unless
Hegel’s completely presuppositionless metaphysics is a viable program. The failure of B-type
theorists to provide an explanation of B-type discordance is objectionable only if there is
something especially onerous about accepting this particular primitive. Since Schroeder
accepts A-type discordance, there should be some asymmetry between A- and B-type. Either,
(i) there is no need to provide an explanation of A-type discordance or (ii) A-type
discordance can be explained.
There are a number of seductive reasons for accepting (i). One may think
‘<inconsistent attitudes>’ just means ‘attitudes with inconsistent contents.’ But this is
obviously false: desiring p while believing ~p is not discordant. One may think instead that
‘<inconsistent> attitudes’ means ‘attitudes of the same type with inconsistent contents.’ This

25 Ibid., 44.
26 Ibid., 52.

12

is getting dangerously close to begging the question, but in any case, it cannot be correct
either. One can fear that Malachi escaped and fear that he did not without discordance and it
is controversial whether desiring p and desiring ~p is discordant.27
Schroeder is explicit that only a small portion of our attitudes are discordant when
they have inconsistent contents: belief and intention are the clearest cases.28 But this just
highlights the fact that <inconsistency> in this debate cannot simply be identified with some
putatively unproblematic notion such as having inconsistent contents. This leads us to option
(ii): A-type discordance can be explained, while B-type cannot. Schroeder dubs the
property—whatever it is—in virtue of which two attitudes with inconsistent contents are
discordant ‘inconsistency-transmission’. He then writes:

Cognitivists, on the other hand, have the easiest of times explaining why these thoughts
[murder is wrong] and [murder is not wrong] are inconsistent. They are inconsistent because
they are beliefs towards inconsistent contents, and belief is inconsistency-transmitting.29
	
  

But this is misleading; the cognitivist has the easiest of times explaining A-type discordance
given an explanation of inconsistency-transmission.30 Without the latter explanation, the
cognitivist merely has a description of what an explanation would look like. Simply naming
the phenomenon does not amount to explaining it. And sometimes Schroeder writes, quite

27 For arguments that it is, see Simon Blackburn, “Attitudes and Contents,” Ethics 98 (1988): 501–17; for
arguments that it is not, see Derek Baker, “Ambivalent Desires and the Problem with Reduction,”
Philosophical Studies 150 (2010): 37-47. Schroeder’s example of an attitude with this property is wondering
whether, Being For, 8.
28 Being For, 40-1.
29 Ibid., 51.
30 Should we refer to Schroeder’s property as “inconsistency-transmission” or as “<inconsistency>transmission?” We do not know. The inconsistency that gets transmitted is semantic inconsistency, which
we have chosen to leave outside of angled brackets. The inconsistency that gets received is discordance or
<inconsistency>. We suspect talk of transmission here is an unhelpful and potentially misleading metaphor.
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differently, that he “is not certain that anyone has given a satisfactory explanation of the Atype inconsistency of intention and belief…”31
We need an explanation of why some attitudes are inconsistency-transmitting whereas
some are not. There is no evidence that the explanation would be similar in each case. It is
not merely beliefs that are inconsistency-transmitting for Schroeder, but also intentions and
the being for attitude. The latter are not truth-apt states. Why would we think that
inconsistency-transmission is explained by the same properties there as in the case of
belief?32
Nor can we explain why beliefs are inconsistency-transmitting simply by appealing to
the fact that they are representational. If one’s beliefs are inconsistent, then one is
representing the world falsely. But explaining inconsistency-transmission solely in terms of
the representational nature of the attitudes both under- and overgenerates. Intentions can be
inconsistency-transmitting, but they are not representational, truth-apt attitudes.33 And
supposing, imagining, entertaining, and plausibly some forms of perception are
representational; yet it is not discordant to, say, suppose p while believing ~p or to have a
perceptual experience representing p while believing ~p.
One might argue that beliefs represent their objects in a special way, different from
suppositions and like attitudes. We suspect this is correct, but note that attempts to account
for finer-grained distinctions within the class of representational (or motivating) attitudes

31 Ibid., chapter 3, fn. 5.
32 Some readers may have been concerned that on our characterization, B-type discordance ceases to be a
unified theoretical class, and turns into a grab-bag, amounting to any discordance that is not A-type. We are
not concerned about this, because we see no reason at present to believe that A-type discordance is a unified
class. It includes both representational and non-representational attitudes. The fact that intentions and beliefs
are both discordant if their contents are inconsistent could turn out to be a very superficial similarity. In the
absence of a larger theoretical picture, such taxonomies should be regarded as arbitrary. See also fn. 60.
33 J. David Velleman, “On the Aim of Belief,” in The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2000): 244-82.
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inevitably appeal to things like functional role, or rationalizing relations among attitudes.34 In
section 2.2 we will argue that all of our examples of B-type discordance plausibly involve
contravention of functional role or breakdown of holistic rational coherence. For now, it is
enough to note that the idea that only A-type conflicts between attitudes would involve
contravention of functional role or fractures in rationalizing connections—and that other
types of psychological conflict could not—is simply incredible without further argument.
We thus cannot charitably read Schroeder as pursuing option (ii). So this leads us
back to (i). If ‘inconsistency’ does not just mean ‘logical inconsistency’ or ‘A-type
discordance,’ what could justify the assumption that B-type stands in need of explanation
whereas A-type does not? One reason suggested by the text is that A-type discordance is
familiar, but B-type discordance is theoretically exotic. Supporting this interpretation, we’ve
already seen that Schroeder writes:

But B-type inconsistency is not something that expressivists can take for granted, because
there are no good examples of it.35
	
  

Now, it seems to us that approving and disapproving of murder is itself an excellent example
of B-type discordance, but in any case, there are others. What’s more, while explanations of
why these cases are discordant are sketchy, they exist, and they work just as well for B-type
cases as for A-type cases.

34 For discussions of finer-grained ways of individuating attitude-types, see Michael Bratman, “Practical
Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context,” Mind 101 (1992): 1-16, and “Intention, Belief, Practical,
Theoretical,” in Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, ed. Simon Robertson
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); J. David Velleman, “The Guise of the Good,” Noûs 26 (1992): 326, and “On the Aim of Belief;” and Karl Schafer, “Perception and the Rational Force of Desire,” The
Journal of Philosophy 110 (2013): 258-81.
35 Being For, 48.
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2.2. Examples of B-type Discordance

Before offering our examples, we wish to sketch out two accounts of why possessing certain
combinations of attitudes strikes us as <inconsistent>. As we’ve noted, we regard these
explanations as incomplete—much as we regard explanations of the nature of the proposition
or of truth. But they have four functions in our argument. First, they show that even if the
expressivist should treat discordance as a primitive within her semantic theory, there is no
need to think that this involves postulating an irreducible, potentially non-natural property.
Second, we will see that these explanatory projects both make predictions about the key
features we should expect discordant attitudes to exhibit; this justifies our assumption that all
of our cases, which are unalike in important respects, are nonetheless instances of the same
phenomenon—that discordant attitudes make up a unified class. Third, it will become
apparent that both explanatory pictures will apply just as well to forms of B-type discordance
as A-type so there is no asymmetry of theoretical respectability. Finally, as we will see in
section 3, both of the available explanations of discordance can be put to work to explain why
sentences expressing discordant attitudes yield a form of communicative breakdown.
The first explanatory project identifies discordance with a strong sense of interpretive
incoherence.36 The person who believes p and believes ~p is incoherent in this way; she
seems to be in disagreement with herself and, while we might ultimately be persuaded to
attribute the contradictory beliefs to her, there will be a residual sense in which it is unclear
what she could be thinking. Intending inconsistent ends is likewise incoherent. If two distinct
people were to intend q and ~q, respectively, we would see them as rivals, and the individual
who intends both is typically committed to undermining his own actions. While we might be

36 See, for example, Donald Davidson, “Incoherence and Irrationality,” Dialectica 39 (1985): 345-54.
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persuaded that someone’s state of mind is best described by attributing an intention that q and
an intention that ~q, the agent falls short of the paradigm case of possessing the relevant
attitude, because (the idea goes) attitudes are in part individuated by their rational
connections to other attitudes.37
The second explanatory project is a Velleman-style account in terms of functional
role.38 Since the function of belief is to represent the world, a belief is doing its job properly
when the world is the way the belief says it is. Of course, the functional-role of beliefs must
be distinguished from representational states like imagining, but providing such an account
here is beyond the scope of the paper.39 Beliefs with inconsistent contents are discordant
since they are guaranteed to misrepresent the world. Given the role intentions play in
directing action, intentions with inconsistent content will likewise see their functional role
undermined.40
We do not wish to commit to either style of explanation and, moreover, we need
not.41 All that is necessary for our purposes is that we convince you that (a) the property we
are calling “discordance” is real and (b) can, in principle, be given a satisfying explanation in
some way such as the two just sketched. We see it as very plausible that each case below can
be explained in either way; moreover, we see this as evidence that these examples form a

37 We do not mean to argue against ways of understanding discordant sets of beliefs in terms, say, of
fragmentation, as in David Lewis’s “Logic for Equivocators,” Noûs 16 (1982): 431-41. Rather, what we are
pointing out is that accommodating discordant beliefs requires relaxing our ordinary ways of understanding
speakers. Treatments such as Lewis’s testify to our point. We should also note that the form of
unintelligibility at work here need not be one recognized within the empirical discipline of psychology. This
is unintelligibility given a project of providing rationalizing interpretations of thoughts and behavior. We
doubt that this counts against its naturalist bona fides, but that problem is outside the scope of this paper.
Our thanks to an anonymous referee for asking us to clarify this.
38 See J. David Velleman, “The Possibility of Practical Reason,’ Ethics 106 (1996): 694-726, and “On the Aim
of Belief.”
39 Presumably it will point to things such as the way beliefs tend to bring out of existence beliefs with
incompatible contents, and the role belief plays in directing action. Readers interested in this problem should
see the titles cited in fn. 33.
40 Michael Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1987).
41 This is quite a good thing—we disagree about which explanation of the two just sketched is more plausible.
Luckily, modding out our differences does not affect our argument in the slightest.
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unified class. We will thus henceforth use the existence of interpretive incoherence, and the
guaranteed contravention of functional role as evidence of discordance. Mere conflict
between attitudes will not be treated as sufficient evidence unless both of these conditions are
met.

2.2.1. Preferences

Comparative preferences42 are a clear case of familiar, yet B-type discordance. The axioms
governing preference yield a natural definition of discordance of preference: discordant
preferences violate the preference axioms.43 But preferences take as their content pairs of
mutually exclusive propositions. It is unclear, then, what it could mean for preferences to be
A-type discordant.
For example, an agent could prefer p to ~p. This seems like a reasonable enough thing
to do. But notice that the contents, p and ~p, are inconsistent. This does not make the
preference discordant. Since discordance of preferences is independent of the inconsistency
of the contents, it is B-type. One might object that this is an overly uncharitable way of
understanding how an A-type partisan would make sense of discordant preferences.
Presumably there would be some more sophisticated way of extending the notion of A-type
discordance to include attitudes which take pairs of propositions as their contents.44 But it is

42 By ‘comparative preferences’ we mean conative attitudes that are explicitly or implicitly comparative in
nature. The most obvious case is preferences, of course. But note that we also have expressions such as ‘I
want pizza rather than ice cream’ or ‘I desire to ride my bike more than I desire to swim’, which are also
comparative, even if they use the verbs ‘want’ or ‘desire’. For an argument that all uses of ‘prefer’ are
implicitly comparative, see Robert Stalnaker, “From Contextualism to Contrastivism,” Philosophical Studies
119 (2004): 73–103.
43 We view the axioms governing preferences as an idealization of our intuitive conception of preference. For
elaboration of this idea, see Philip Pettit, “Decision Theory and Folk Psychology,” in Rules, Reasons, and
Norms: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 192-221; and James Dreier, “Rational
Preference: Decision Theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality,” Theory and Decision 40 (1996): 249-76.
44 Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping us clarify this point.
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unclear how the notion could be extended; and in any case, it seems unnecessary for
understanding discordance of preference.
Alternatively, one might try to account for discordance of preference by suggesting
that the preference actually implicitly posits a relation between the two states of affairs
represented by the propositions. So long as the relation in question is transitive and
asymmetric, discordance of preference will be explainable in terms of semantic
inconsistency.45 The most natural candidate is the better than relation.46 There is some
plausibility to the idea that to prefer one thing to another, one must regard it as better in some
way. But note that this does not explain the axioms. For example, pizza is better than ice
cream in some respect, but ice cream is certainly better than pizza in some other respect. So,
if preferences represented one of their objects as better in some way than the other, a person
could have asymmetric preferences without any semantic inconsistency in the contents. In
order to explain the axioms solely on the basis of semantic inconsistency, one must insist that
preferences always represent one object as superior to the other in the same respect. But this
is psychologically implausible. Utility is typically understood as a theoretical construct within
Decision Theory because of the implausibility that our preferences rank options according to
a single measure of value.
So we suggest that discordance of preference should be understood as a form of Btype discordance.47 Given the plausible functional role of preferences—directing choice—
preferences that violate the axioms contravene their functional role. A person with cyclic
preferences is famously vulnerable to Dutch books, and hence is willing to expend effort and
resources to undermine the intended effects of his own most recent choice. And such a

45 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
46 Those interested in developing such an account should see John Broome, Weighing Goods: Equality,
Uncertainty, and Time, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991).
47 Jamie Dreier, in his Author-meets-Critics session on Being For, notes that the natural way to understand
inconsistency of preference is B-type <inconsistency>. Alan Gibbard makes the same point in his recent
book, Normativity and Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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person’s psychology is plausibly incoherent in the Davidsonian sense;48 it is entirely unclear
if there is anything we can say the person who prefers p to q, q to r, and r to p really wants
most.

2.2.2. Credential States

Credences present another case of B-type discordance. A credence of .6 in p is not a belief
that p has a 60% chance of being true. The .6 corresponds to the strength of one’s confidence
that p. In other words, it represents an idealized property of the psychological state which
takes p as its content. In everyday English we would describe being in this state as having as
moderate confidence that p. Now, a person with a credence of .6 that p is rationally required
to have a credence of .4 that ~p. Such a person has consistent credences regarding p. A
person with a .6 credence that p and a .5 credence that ~p is discordant. The contents of the
first person’s credences are identical to the contents of the credences of the second. So the
discordance cannot be explained merely by the contents—it must be B-type.49
Imagine that Bob is almost certain that there was a first president of the United States,
is highly confident that the first president was George Washington, and is highly doubtful
that it was some person other than Washington. His friend Steve, on the other hand, is certain
that there was a first president of the United States, but is highly doubtful that the first
president was George Washington, and is highly doubtful that it was some person other than
Washington. Steve’s attitudes are discordant, Bob’s are not. Yet the contents of their
credences are identical. So Steve must suffer from a case of B-type discordance. The
discordance, moreover, is a form of interpretive incoherence. His psychology is, to some

48 Failure of preference transitivity is one of Davidson’s examples of psychological incoherence, in his
“Incoherence and Irrationality.”
49 See again Gibbard’s Meaning and Normativity for a similar take on credences and B-type discordance.
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degree, unintelligible: Steve seems to lack any stable considered opinion about the first
president of the United States. As far as functional role goes, credences like beliefs
presumably have the function of representing the world, but in a manner that allows for
uncertainty. Steve’s credences clearly contravene that functional role.

2.2.3. Intentions and Beliefs

Intending ends that one believes inconsistent is also discordant. For example, if I intend p
and I intend q while simultaneously believing p only if ~q, my intentions and beliefs are
discordant. But the belief must be present to make the intentions discordant. Given that both
beliefs and intentions are supposed to coordinate to present the agent with a picture of the
world and direct him to make changes within it, this combination of attitudes seems to clearly
contravene its functional role. Difficulty in interpreting the attitudes is also present—it is
unclear what I am really trying to do, or if I really do believe that p and q are incompatible.
Schroeder himself allows that intentions can be <inconsistent> with beliefs, as well as
with each other. Schroeder postulates that there is a master expressivist attitude, the being for
attitude, and argues, for reasons given in the first section, that for an expressivist beliefs must
reduce to a special case of being for. Schroeder goes on to argue that one advantage of this
reduction is that we could plausibly reduce intention to a special case of being for as well,
and this “would explain why intending to is inconsistent with believing that you will not,
without requiring any positive belief that you will…”50
Admittedly Schroeder can treat discordance between intentions and beliefs as A-type.
But consider the dialectic. The reason the expressivist had to conclude beliefs were really
conative was that there were no good examples of B-type discordance. Conative beliefs, then,

50 Being For, 101.
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were the only way to explain how normative and non-normative sentences could be
discordant with one another. Only after it is accepted that beliefs are conative is the
possibility of discordance between beliefs and intentions taken seriously. But this raises a
question: why couldn’t the expressivist have introduced discordance of belief and intention
earlier, as a good example of inter-attitudinal discordance and hence B-type discordance?
This would have obviated the need to identify beliefs as conative in the first place.
As another way of making the same point, Schroeder can be seen as arguing:

1.

Beliefs and intentions can be discordant with each other.

2.

If attitudes are discordant, they are A-type discordant.

3.

If attitudes can be A-type discordant, then they are attitudes of the same type.

4.

Conclusion: Beliefs and intentions are attitudes of the same type.

But one man’s ponens is another man’s tollens: the expressivist can insist that 4 is false, and
conclude from that that 2 must be false as well.
Why would the expressivist reject 4? For one thing, it leads the expressivist to noncognitivism about beliefs, which Schroeder correctly describes as a reductio of expressivism.
It requires, moreover, rejecting a typical motivation for expressivism—that normative
language and descriptive language have fundamentally different roles, that the first has to do
with motivation and the second with assessing an independently given world.
The other oddity with Schroeder’s argument is apparent on a second glance. It has
nothing to do with expressivism. If the argument is sound, it is sound whether or not
expressivism is true. If A-type discordance is the only sort and if beliefs and intentions are
directly discordant, then intentions and beliefs must be attitudes of the same sort, regardless
of one’s semantics. But then either non-cognitivism about belief must be true, or cognitivism
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about intention. Surely this is too strong. Arguments have been advanced in favor of
cognitivism about intention, the thesis that intention is really a species of belief.51
Nonetheless, the position is controversial; there is common-sense plausibility to the idea that
intentions and beliefs are distinct types of mental states.52 Given this, it is unclear why the
expressivist is forbidden from putting forward the discordance between belief and intention
as a plausible example of B-type discordance.

2.2.4. Non-Propositional Attitudes

Note that the above examples of B-type discordance all had, as their content, some variation
on propositional content. This does not exhaust the realm of attitudes that can be discordant.
We will discuss here non-propositional attitudes, starting with the simple attitudes of like and
dislike, then discussing the more complicated case of approval and disapproval. We start with
the obvious fact that we typically like things or actions, not propositions. I can, of course, like
that Joe is at the coffee shop, but this is not the common case. The targets of our evaluations
are typically things like hamburgers, coffee shops, cigarette brands, people, dancing, and
going to the store. We like Susan, Camels, rye whiskey, doing cartwheels, and the curve of
our partner’s neck. We dislike Fred, Newports, vodka, waiting at the DMV, and the new
shoes our partner mistakenly bought us on a whim. The naïve and correct view of the
structure of such attitudes is object directed.53 When we like Fred, the content of the attitude
we are giving voice to is Fred—or, at worst, a non-propositional representation of Fred. It is

51 For example, see Velleman, “The Possibility of Practical Reason.”
52 See Michael Bratman, “Cognitivism about Practical Reason,” Ethics 102 (1992): 117-28, and his “Belief,
Intention, Theoretical, Practical.”
53 Note that we cannot reduce liking and disliking to preferences since the structure of preferences is
irreducibly comparative whereas the structure of likes and dislikes is not. Thanks to Jamie Dreier for
conversation about this point.
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not that Fred exists or that Fred is thus and so or even a collection of Fred-properties.54
Possessing a pair of attitudes such as liking and disliking aimed at a similar subject
(say, the unfortunate shoes my partner bought me) is a paradigmatic example of discordance.
We can be conflicted about something, of course, and indecisive. We can fail to know
whether we like or dislike something. We can like that X is such and so while disliking that Y
is thus and so. This relation could even be fine grained: we like the Thai food for being spicy,
but dislike it for being painful, even though the painfulness may be constitutive of the
spiciness.55 But it is discordant to have an all things considered like and an all things
considered dislike of one and the same object, or like and dislike it under the same aspect. To
like or dislike something in this way, even privately, is to take a stand on something. The
interpersonal role of these attitudes is to guide our group decisions and to coordinate our
reactions to various events. (When we say that they guide group decisions, we mean this only
in the very quotidian sense that what a group of people like and dislike for dinner will guide
the group’s decision on what to eat.) The intrapersonal role is to structure our decisions over
time. Since liking and disliking of one and the same thing contravenes this purpose, it is
discordant. Note also that we are inclined to interpret a claim that someone likes and dislikes
something as the claim that they like different aspects of that thing, or that they alternate
between liking and disliking it over time. The state of mind is thus also plausibly incoherent
in the interpretive sense given above. Discordance of like and dislike cannot be a case of Atype discordance since (a) objects cannot be inconsistent with each other and (b) it is a case
of distinct attitudes aimed at identical objects.
Of course, there is good reason to posit hidden structure in the case of other

54 This naïve view has a long pedigree. To our knowledge, it is first explicitly discussed in Book IV of the
Republic in the course of Plato's argument for the tripartite division of the soul. See (437E-439A).
55 For example and more discussion of “hyperintensional” forms of ambivalence, see Baker, “Ambivalent
Desires;” and Matt Strohl, “Horror and Hedonic Ambivalence,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
70 (2012): 203-12.
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intensional transitive verbs such as ‘wants,’ which yields an ambiguity when placed in either
the past or the future tense and adverbially modified.56 Consider: ‘I wanted an iPad before
any of my colleagues.’ This might mean that before any of my friends wanted an iPad, I
wanted an iPad. It also might mean that I wanted [to have] an iPad before anyone [else] had
an iPad. The natural way to explain this ambiguity is to posit hidden structure. If we construe
‘want’ as ‘want to have’ then we can explain the ambiguity easily. In the former case, ‘before
anyone’ modifies ’want.’ In the latter, it modifies ‘to have.’ This sort of consideration is the
best reason for positing hidden structure. But the same sort of ambiguity does not arise for
‘like.’ ‘Joe liked Berlin before any of his friends’ does not suffer from an ambiguity which
could be resolved by positing unarticulated structure between ‘liked’ and ‘Berlin’ as we must
do to resolve the ambiguity in ‘Joe wanted an iPad before anyone’. If there is an ambiguity
here, it’s a lexical ambiguity concerning ‘before’, not a structural ambiguity as in our case
above.57 So, the best reason for positing hidden structure for intensional transitive verbs like
‘want’ does not hold for the case of ‘like’.
‘Like’ and ‘dislike’ are not the only examples of intensional transitive verbs which
admit of something like B-type discordance. ‘Admire’, ‘disdain’, ‘love’, ‘hate’, and so on all
seem to have the same sort of character. They cannot in any straightforward way be
translated into propositional attitudes, they take a direct object, and they can stand in
coherence relations with one another. We should expect that many of these can stand in
relations of B-type discordance to one another.58

56 Graeme Forbes, Attitude Problems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
57 Note also that there are cases like ‘Joe liked New York in the fall’, which seem weakly ambiguous. The
ambiguity here is to be resolved by distinguishing between two possible objects: New York and New Yorkin-the-fall, not by adding propositional structure. Also, and more importantly, it’s enough for our purposes
here to demonstrate a single unambiguous case. Additional ambiguous cases do not matter.
58 For further convincing arguments against sententialism for all attitudes, see Alex Grzankowski “Not All
Attitudes are Propositional,” European Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. For a contrasting view about the
nature of the contents of some emotions, such as moods, see Angela Mendelovici “Intentionalism about
Moods,” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2 (2013): 126-36.
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2.2.5. Approval and Disapproval

We can like and dislike not just objects, but also actions such as dancing. Just as liking Susie
and disliking Susie is discordant, liking dancing and disliking dancing is discordant. But acttypes, like propositions and unlike ordinary objects, take negations in some sense. Thus, we
can like not dancing while we cannot like not shoes. Note that we still cannot explain the
discordance of liking dancing and disliking dancing by means of the inconsistency of the
content.59 The reason for this is that there is nothing incoherent about liking dancing and
liking not dancing, that just makes you easy-going; and if your grandmother dislikes dancing
and dislikes not dancing, she is being curmudgeonly, but not discordant. However, disliking
dancing and liking dancing is discordant.
Similar remarks apply to attitudes like approval and disapproval. This is especially
important given the common expressivist analysis of moral judgments in terms of approval,
disapproval, and tolerance. Compare the following two pairs of sentences:

(1a) Joe disapproves of dancing.
(1b) Joe disapproves of not dancing.

(2a) Joe disapproves of dancing.
(2b) Joe approves of dancing.
	
  

59 Strictly speaking, actions do not stand in semantic relations like propositions. However, dancing (at a time,
in a place, etc.) excludes not dancing (at that place, at that time, etc.) The looseness of our discussion on this
point thus should not cause any confusion.
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It should be clear that the pair (1a) and (1b) is not discordant; it is simply the attitudes of
someone who is mean-spirited. (2a) and (2b) are, however, discordant. The comparison
shows that this inconsistency cannot be A-type.
Summing up, B-type discordance does not just seem to be theoretically useful and
methodologically legitimate, it seems to border on a necessary part of an explanation of
certain attitudes, such as those which are not inconsistency transmitting, but which can be
discordant. For the purpose of the latter half of the paper, note that one important lesson of
these examples is that quite frequently some other factor needs to be invoked, other than
semantic or logical inconsistency, to explain why certain collections of attitudes are
discordant and others, like approving of two situations which exclude one another, are not.60

2.3. Can B-type Accounts Be Explanatory?

Schroeder occasionally raises another worry for B-type accounts which is unconnected with
skepticism about the existence of the B-type discordance, but motivated instead by
skepticism about its theoretical utility in an expressivist semantics. He writes that if one does
not accept his A-type account:

The only alternative is to posit, along with Horgan and Timmons, an infinite hierarchy of
distinct and logically unrelated attitudes and to postulate that they miraculously bear the right
inconsistency relations to one another. Views like theirs and Gibbard’s don’t tell us what ‘not’

60 A-type discordance groups intentions and beliefs together, as attitudes that are both discordant when their
contents are semantically inconsistent. But we could just as well have grouped attitudes according to
representational and conative cases of inconsistency. Then beliefs and credences would have been grouped
together, while intentions, preferences, and likings would also make a class. Or we could have divided
attitudes according to whether their content was propositional or not, arriving at a new taxonomy. We of
course will continue to speak of A- and B-type discordance throughout the remainder of the paper. But we
see no reason at all to believe that the taxonomy carves forms of discordance at the joints. Thanks to an
anonymous referee for asking us to clarify this point.
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means. They tell us what elaborate hypothesis has to be true, in order for expressivism to be
true, but they don’t do anything at all to make this hypothesis credible.61 [emphasis ours]
	
  

Horgan and Timmons develop an expressivist account according to which each logically
complex sentence expresses a distinct type of attitude.62 In other words ‘Grass is green and
murder is wrong’ expresses one type of attitude, and ‘Grass is not green or murder is not
wrong’ expresses a different type of attitude. This holds for each new complex sentence. The
problem Schroeder identifies is that this requires we postulate an infinite number of different
attitude types and an infinite number of distinct B-type discordance relations between them.
Finally—though he is less clear on this point—the majority of the attitudes types posited are
intuitively unfamiliar, and so we have no way of checking whether the claims the theory
makes about discordance relations are independently credible. Schroeder believes that any Btype account will have to resort to similar theoretical expedients. Or, at least, this is what is
suggested by claiming that this is ‘the only alternative’ to his account. So it may be that
Schroeder’s rejection of B-type expressivism does not depend on his arguments against Btype discordance.
The first point to make in response to this problem is that while we believe an
expressivist account is allowed to appeal to unexplained primitives, it is obviously
unacceptable for a theory to appeal to an infinite number of unexplained primitives. While
this is clearly a powerful objection to the B-type expressivism put forward by Horgan and
Timmons, it is not obvious that Schroeder is justified in criticizing Gibbard on the same
grounds (likewise with Blackburn and Dreier). Schroeder does claim of Gibbard’s theory:

61 Being For, 61.
62 Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons “Cognitivist Expressivism,” in Metaethics after Moore, eds. T. Horgan
and M. Timmons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 255-98.
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…[W]hat it is really saying is merely that ‘murder is not wrong’ must express a mental state
that is inconsistent with all and only the hyperdecided mental states that ‘murder is wrong’ is
not inconsistent with. And again, that looks more like a list of the criteria that we hope the
attitude expressed by ‘murder is not wrong’ will satisfy, in lieu of a concrete story about
which mental state this actually is, and why it turns out to be inconsistent with the right other
mental states.63

The claim that Gibbard gives no concrete story about the mental state is strange, given that
Schroeder himself writes earlier in the same book that Gibbard’s “primary claim is to
construct an expressivist language to express intentions—plans, as he calls them.”64 As for
the complaint that Gibbard cannot explain why the relevant mental states are discordant, it is
presented much too quickly to tell if it is based on anything other than Schroeder’s rejection
of B-type discordance, or whether there are additional difficulties as there are in the case of
Horgan and Timmons.
In any case, an objection like Schroeder’s, that there are far too many individual
attitudes expressed on the expressivist account, is far more pressing when we lack a
compositional story about how to obtain complex mental states from simple ones.65 A similar
objection could be raised against the number of sentence meanings, but such an objection is
misplaced in the presence of a compositional account. Gibbard’s own theory, if it is
committed to an infinite number of complex mental states (an issue on which we are neutral),
seems especially well suited to telling a compositional story about them. Atomic sentences
express being in the same mental state as a set of hyperdecided agents—agents with fully
complete, fully coherent sets of intentions and beliefs. The logical connectives denote
operations on these sets: negation the complement, disjunction the union, and conjunction the

63 Being For, 52.
64 Being For, 13. To be fair, this degree of concrete detail was not part of Gibbard’s initial proposal in Wise
Choices, but was added in Thinking How to Live.
65 Mark Richard, When Truth Gives Out (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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intersection. In that case, if ‘p and q’ expresses a complex state, we can identify it as the state
that will be shared by all maximally decided and coherent agents who have both the state
expressed by p and the state expressed by q. Note that if orthodox functionalism about mental
states is true, there must be some set of psychological dispositions shared by all such agents
(though it may lack a name in English; it may not even be an attitude). Any inconsistency
relations that a set of dispositions stands in can be explained by the relation that it must bear
to the dispositions making up the simpler attitudes. The key point here is that the image of a
logical operation like conjunction on attitudes may not itself be an attitude, though what it is
will depend on the attitude it is applied to—a familiar and often overlooked point in the
literature on the Frege-Geach problem due originally to R.M. Hare.66
Even if we are overly optimistic here—or, what’s more likely, such a compositional
story cannot be told in Gibbard’s framework for anything beyond the logical connectives—
this does not show that B-type expressivism cannot be pursued, only that extant versions fail.
The points raised by Schroeder and Richard show two connected desiderata a B-type account
must meet. First, the number of unexplained primitives posited by a theory must be finite.
Second, if a theory posits an infinite number of complex mental states, the discordance
relations among these should be explained by compositional relations between simpler
mental states, mirroring the compositional form of the language.
Schroeder clearly regards the Gibbardian solutions as a clear case of theft over honest
toil. In his later book he charges it with being “Non-constructive and Unexplanatory.”67
Schroeder goes on to argue that “no formally adequate expressivist account satisfying a
couple of very simple constraints can be constructive.”68 This argument, however, cannot be

66 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Claredon Oxford Press, 1952).
67 Noncognitivism in Ethics, 131.
68 Ibid., 133.
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an independent reason for rejecting B-type expressivism; one of the “very simple constraints”
turns out to be that the theory restrict itself to A-type discordance:69

This means that [if we rely on attitudes of approval and disapproval] not only have we failed
to give an account of what mental state is expressed by ‘stealing money is wrong’, but also
that there is no state that we can assign to it, such that we can explain all of the inconsistencies
that we need to explain as cases of disapproving of inconsistent contents—which disagree in
the same, non-Moorean way, as beliefs with inconsistent contents do: by being cases of the
same attitude with inconsistent contents.70	
  

But we also have something new here—a distinction between Moorean and non-Moorean
disagreement. Schroeder’s new thought seems to be that B-type discordance is simply the
wrong type of discordance to explain the logical properties of normative sentences. Note that
this worry is different from saying that B-type discordance does not exist, and thus is not
settled by our prior examples. This objection, if cogent, would undermine much of the
interest in B-type discordance. Happily, it is no more cogent than the previous objection.
Examining why will allow us to flesh out how we think a B-type account should go.

3. Incoherence: Semantic and Psychological—and a
Diagnosis of the Mistake

69 We actually do not know what Schroeder could have in mind by ‘constructive’ other than not relying on Btype inconsistency—on a normal interpretation, the account offered in Being For is inferior to Gibbard’s
own with regards to its constructiveness. This is not meant as tu quoque. It is simply that, until a clearer
criterion for explanatory constructiveness is offered, we are not in any position to judge Schroeder's account
explanatorily superior to Gibbard's.
70 Ibid., 135.
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The worry is how normative utterances, on typical B-type expressivist accounts, can stand in
logical relations of inconsistency.71 Restriction to A-type discordance could potentially be
motivated by the thought that sentences expressing attitudes could not be logically
inconsistent, unless the contents of the attitudes expressed by them were logically
inconsistent. The distinction Schroeder invokes between Moorean and non-Moorean
<inconsistencies> comes from van Roojen.72 The problem van Roojen presents is that not all
cases of psychological conflict are cases of logical error. Moore’s paradox—‘It is raining but
I don’t believe that it’s raining’—clearly expresses a fractured psychology. But there is no
logical error involved, since both conjuncts can be true. Some expressivist accounts, such as
Blackburn’s, seem to conflate the two types, treating any case of fractured psychology as a
logical error.73
This is where our claim that the expressivist should appeal to properties of the
language used to express attitudes as an explanatory resource becomes relevant. Schroeder,
along with van Roojen and, as we will see, Zangwill, believes that expressivists must find a
special sub-class of discordance to account for logical inconsistency, as opposed to the
broadly linguistic inconsistency of the Moore-paradoxical sentence. Since accounting for the
logical properties of sentences is to provide a necessary component to a solution of the FregeGeach problem, this amounts to the claim that no solution to the Frege-Geach problem could
be genuine, unless it provides a successful psychologistic explanation of logic. We will argue
that expressivists are instead entitled to something much closer to the standard understanding
of logic, and that cleaving more tightly to the standard understanding of logic in fact frees
expressivists of the need to identify an especially “logical” form of discordance.

71 Of course, given an explanation of inconsistency, an explanation of entailment generally follows.
72 Van Roojen, “Expressivism and Irrationality.”
73 Blackburn, Spreading the Word.
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3.1. Moore’s Paradox and Varieties of Inconsistency

On one standard cognitivist semantics, sentences denote propositions, and propositions can
stand in all sorts of relations of entailment and inconsistency. Sentences are inconsistent only
if their propositions are; moreover, inconsistency is primarily a property of propositions, and
sentences are logically inconsistent in part because the propositions they express are
inconsistent.74
The expressivist cannot use this story. If the meaning of the sentence is the attitude
expressed, we are committed to logically inconsistent sentence ‘meanings’ that do not stand
in relations of entailment, but instead relations of rational coherence or contravention of role.
The strangeness of this position may in part motivate Schroeder’s rejection of B-type
discordance. He writes:

[Mark van Roojen’s (1996)] diagnosis was that though Blackburn may have explained why
there is something irrational about accepting the premises of an argument and denying its
conclusion, irrationality is too easy to come by in order to suffice for an account of validity.
Lots of combinations of mental states are irrational.

So the moral of the failure of HOA [Higher-Order Attitude] approaches is that if expressivists
are going to explain a version of the inconsistency property or the inference licensing property
that suffices to distinguish valid argument from invalid arguments, then they can’t appeal to
just any old kind of rational conflict between mental states—they need to appeal to the very
kind of clash that obtains between beliefs with inconsistent contents.75
	
  

74 Note that this “in part” explanation is compatible with what we take to be the sensible realist position, that
vocabulary is also essential to explaining logical relations among sentences.
75 Noncogntivism in Ethics, 122.
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This is a mistake. The expressivist story about logic should proceed in two steps. First, they
should note that directly inconsistent (logically or otherwise) sentences are incoherent in the
sense of yielding a communicative breakdown. When someone endorses premises but refuses
to grant the conclusion they obviously entail, or asserts ‘p and q’ but refuses to grant the truth
of p, we are not entirely sure how to make sense of the speaker’s assertions. This fact should
form the core of the expressivist account of the various forms of linguistic inconsistency. As
we’ve noted, for the expressivist the more complex, regimented features of meaning should
be grounded in the communicative role of the sentences. Each of the two accounts of the
nature of discordance (provided in section 2.2) allow us to explain why a set of inconsistent
sentences are unintelligible, why they fail in communication.
On the Davidsonian explanation of discordance, we have an extremely simple
explanation of why inconsistent sentences are incoherent. The sentences express a
psychology that is uninterpretable, or at least very difficult to sensibly interpret. The
sentences get their meaning, at the most fundamental level, by expressing the speaker’s
psychology. They are able to fulfill their other meaning-related roles—denoting, asserting—
in virtue of the fact that they express a psychology. If the psychology expressed is incoherent,
their use does not coherently denote or assert. So we do not understand what the speaker is
saying.
If we use the functional-role explanation of discordance, our explanation will be
different, but only marginally more complicated. Sentences can be understood as expressing
commitments, where those commitments are understood in terms of the functional role of the
relevant attitude. A sentence expressing the belief that p can be understood as expressing a
commitment to reason and behave in the ways constitutive of the belief that p.76 A sentence

76 This definition of belief may seem to saddle the expressivist with the non-cognitivism about belief we found
unattractive in Schroeder’s theory. The expressivist can say that the sentence expresses, among other things,
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expressing approval for something can be understood to express a commitment to ‘reason’
(i.e., update one’s other attitudes) and behave in the ways definitive of such approval. Since
discordance, on this picture, involves having attitudes that cause mutual functional
breakdowns, there will be no commitments definitive of a discordant mental state; or, at the
very least, no precise commitments. Once again, the other aspects of a sentence’s meaning
are explained by the commitments it expresses. So, the unclarity of the commitments being
expressed explains the general incoherence of the sentences.
Now at this point, we do not yet have an explanation of logical inconsistency. As van
Roojen points out, Moore-paradoxical sentences are “inconsistent” with each other, in a sense;
but they are not logically inconsistent. ‘It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining’
strikes us as a contradiction, even though it is not literally a contradiction; both conjuncts
could be true.77 The standard explanation of why this sentence strikes us as contradictory is
that it is a pragmatic contradiction. Assertion pragmatically implies or commits the asserter to
belief (or knowledge) of what is asserted, but the assertor of a Moore-paradoxical
construction denies he believes his assertion. The worry for the expressivist, however, is that
she may be forced to conflate pragmatic contradiction with semantic or logical contradiction.
The challenge for the expressivist is to show that she can explain why ‘it is raining,
but I don’t believe it is raining’ involves no logical or semantic inconsistency—that it is a
mere pragmatic contradiction rather than a logical or semantic contradiction. In the next
section we do both, showing that the expressivist, appealing solely to properties of the
language expressing the attitudes, has a principled account of how the Moore-Paradoxical
sentence is merely a pragmatic contradiction. Most readers will have guessed at this point
that our explanation of why such contradiction is non-logical involves off-loading logical

commitments to reasoning and behavior, though these commitments do not exhaust what it is to have the
belief (they are necessary, not sufficient). We would like to thank the editor who suggested this clarification.
77 Van Roojen, “Expressivism and Irrationality,” 332.
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relations onto formal features of the language. But Moore-paradoxical sentences still leave
the expressivist with a serious problem in distinguishing semantic from pragmatic
inconsistency; in other words, the expressivist must have a principled explanation of how
both conjuncts could be true, despite her commitment to explaining truth in terms of
communicative failure and (ultimately) psychological discordance. We will first account for
what is easier—logical inconsistency—then what is harder—avoiding collapse of pragmatic
and semantic inconsistency.

3.2. Logical Inconsistency as a Property of Sentences and an
Account of Semantic Contradiction

The expressivist should insist that logical properties are primarily properties of sentences, and
that sentences can be logically inconsistent even though what they express (attitudes) cannot
be. Sentences are broadly inconsistent in virtue of expressing discordant attitudes: attitudes
which yield an unintelligible psychology or a set of incompatible commitments. As a first
pass, logical inconsistency is what happens when a set of sentences express discordant
attitudes in virtue of the logical vocabulary. In other words, we may not know which attitudes
any of the logically primitive sentences express; we just need to know that, given how logical
vocabulary connects or modifies those primitive sentences, they must express a
psychologically <inconsistent> set of attitudes. We don't know which particular attitude is
expressed by a normative sentence p but it must be discordant with the attitude expressed by
~p. This runs entirely parallel to the standard realist account of logical inconsistency
identified in section 1.1—logically inconsistent sentences are just the subset of inconsistent
sentences identifiable as such solely in virtue of logical vocabulary.
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Consequently, expressivist accounts must be able to specify a set of rules which tell
you how to get from attitudes that can be expressed to others on the basis of the logical
expressions that occur in the sentence, with that state of mind having appropriate relations of
harmony and discordance.78 That is, in parallel to realist semantics use of truth-functional
operators, expressivists need to specify an attitude-theoretic function to stand as the
denotation of an expression like ‘not’ when applied to moral sentences. A suitable account of
how we pick out the logical vocabulary in these cases must also be given.
More complexity will be needed. Our account of logical inconsistency will have to
extend the basis on which sentences can be identified as inconsistent to include some
knowledge of which terms are occurring as objects, which as predicates, etc. ‘Murdering is
wrong’ is logically inconsistent with ‘murdering is not wrong’ rather than ‘not murdering is
wrong.’ We will thus need a broad notion of logical structure to replace logical vocabulary.79
So our more refined version of the thesis is: sentences are logically inconsistent when they
are identifiable as expressing psychologically inconsistent attitudes entirely in virtue of their
logical structure.
‘It is raining’ and ‘I believe it’s not raining’ are broadly inconsistent when uttered by
the same speaker, because they express a discordant state of mind; but they are not logically
inconsistent. One must understand what ‘believes’ means in order to know that the attitudes
expressed are discordant. ‘Believes’ is not plausibly part of our logical vocabulary, and
neither is the connection between assertion and belief a part of our basic apparatus for

78 When, of course, the attitudes expressed are discordance-apt. A fully worked out attitude-theoretic account
would need to include an account of which sentences express discordance-apt, and hence attitude-functional
negation taking, attitudes and which do not.
79 Note that this commitment to some form of pre-semantics is a commitment shared by all semantic theories—
the main difference is that the majority of work in semantics has been on non-normative language and the
pre-semantics of non-normative language is more familiar. Note also that this is the sense in which such
sentences are interpreted (see fn. 6). The interpretation does not involve assigning a particular meaning to
the sentence; it requires instead that we identify the logical structure: which terms are predicates, which are
names, which are quantifiers, which are connectives and operators.
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understanding logical form. As far as our logic is concerned, sincere assertion might express
a commitment to disbelief or preference. On the other hand ‘murder is wrong’ and ‘murder is
not wrong’ are identifiable as expressing inconsistent attitudes simply by knowing that ‘not’
switches the attitude expressed to its complement (one doesn’t need to know that ‘wrong’
expresses disapproval). The property of expressing an <inconsistent> state of mind is not to
be identified with the property of logical inconsistency on the expressivist’s account any
more than the property of being necessarily false is to be identified with the property of being
logically inconsistent on the realist’s account. Both accounts need to add a formal element—
that is, a choice of logical constants whose meaning is held fixed—to accommodate logical
inconsistency.80
While it may seem like a cost to expressivism that it grants sentences logical
properties that are not possessed by the things those sentences express, we should remind
ourselves that on sensible realist accounts, this is also the case. It is simply a consequence of
the fact that logic is formal, and meanings, whether propositions or expressed attitudes, are
not.81 Or, if they do have a formal aspect, the most natural way for a realist to capture this is
to allow for a fine-grained propositions, which are partially individuated by their relations to
sentences. The expressivist analogue of this will be discussed in section 3.3.
Explaining why ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’s raining’ isn’t a logical
contradiction is easy for the expressivist. Explaining why it is a pragmatic contradiction—

80 Michael Ridge has also recently argued that an expressivist account of logical inconsistency needs to appeal
to formality in order to keep logical inconsistency from over-generating. We regret that this work was
released too late for us to be able to take more detailed account of it. See his Impassioned Belief, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014).
81 Ruth Weintraub also notes that expressivists will need to (and are entitled to) distinguish between
entailments that are semantic or analytic, and those that are logical. She notes that the difference is that
analytic entailments hold in virtue of the meaning, but that “logical truth is formal.” See her “Logic for
Expressivists,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2011): 601-16.

38

rather than a semantic contradiction—is harder.82 Expressivism of course relies on the
distinction between expressing an attitude and self-attributing an attitude to avoid collapse
into subjectivism. The expressivist can thus appeal to the same distinction as the realist. ‘It is
raining’ expresses a belief that it is raining, but does not describe such a belief. ‘I don’t
believe that it is raining’ describes a belief. The conflict is not between what the first and
second conjunct denote, but between what the first conjunct expresses and the second denotes.
This is correct, but the difficulty is that the expressivist is committed to explaining the
truth and falsity of sentences in terms of their inconsistency. Inconsistency, in turn, is
explained by the incompatibility of figuring in coherent communication, because the
sentences express discordant states of mind. A Moore-paradoxical sentence fails to
communicate, and it does so because of what seems like a discordant state of mind.83 Given
that an agent cannot possibly accept ‘It is raining’ and ‘I don’t believe it is raining’ without
discordance, how does an expressivist resist the conclusion that these sentences are
inconsistent, and hence cannot be true at the same time?
The inconsistency of an assertion of ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’s raining’
depends heavily on context. Most obviously, it depends on the first-person indexical—‘it’s
raining, but Frank doesn’t believe it’s raining’ is unproblematic—but it also depends on an
implicit ‘now’ and ‘actually’ to generate the sense of contradiction. ‘It was raining, but I
didn’t believe it was raining’ is intelligible, as is ‘it could have been raining, but I wouldn’t
have believed it was raining’. If the expressivist can maintain that truth and falsity are

82 While there is substantial pressure for the expressivist to account for non-normative meaning in terms of the
attitudes—beliefs—expressed, so that the semantic theory is unified, we suspect there are ways for the
expressivist to resist this. Nonetheless, we will use a standard Moore-paradoxical case. Even if we are
correct, it is possible that normative versions of Moore’s paradox can be generated, though for some worries
about such cases, see Jack Woods, “Expressivism and Moore’s Paradox,” Philosopher’s Imprint 14 (2014):
1-12.
83 Believing that one does not have a belief is arguably another case of B-type discordance. It is intuitively a
case of psychological incoherence and a threat to the proper functioning of first-order belief. For argument
in favor of and elaboration of this position, see Sydney Shoemaker, “On Knowing One’s Own Mind,”
Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 183-209, and “Self-Knowledge and Moore’s Paradox,” Philosophical
Studies 77 (1995): 211-28.
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explained by sentential inconsistency, so long as the inconsistency does not depend on
context, she will have a way of distinguishing pragmatic from semantic contradiction. For
example, if the expressivist can maintain that truth and falsity are explained by sentential
inconsistency only if the inconsistency does not essentially84 depend on indexical expressions,
she will have a way of resisting the claim that the Moore-paradoxical sentence is a literal
contradiction. This would provide an explanation of why this particular communicative
conflict between asserted conjuncts is disconnected from their truth.85
Can the expressivist offer a defense that isn’t ad hoc? In fact, such a position follows
almost inevitably from reflection on the disquotational role played by truth. If Frank says, ‘it
is raining’, and Lou says ‘what Frank said is true’, one of the functions of Frank’s ascription
of truth is to reassert that it is raining. Likewise, saying ‘“the dog is brown’’ is true’ is a way
of asserting that the dog is brown. Expressivists are under considerable pressure to maintain a
deflationary picture of truth, where there isn’t much more to truth than its role as a
disquotational device. But even if we adopt a more robust picture, everyone should agree that
being able to serve as a disquotational device is an essential component of our concept of
truth and our ascriptions of truth to sentences.
What needs to be explained is why we can say of Moore-paradoxical utterances that
they can be true, while explaining truth and falsity at least partially in terms of discordance.
The trick is to notice that pragmatic features of assertions, such as speaker, location, and
context are not preserved in all quotation contexts. Thus in some quotation contexts, the

84 We use “essentially” to indicate that there’s a particular kind of dependency on indexical expression we’re
not concerned with—‘I’m at the store and I’m not’ is semantically inconsistent, but it does not essentially
depend on the presence of the first-person pronoun.
85 There remains the question of how to generally distinguish pragmatic from semantic inconsistency. We will
not offer a solution to that here, since it would require considering large numbers of pragmatic
inconsistencies that the expressivist is under pressure to conflate with the semantic. The strategy we are
pursuing here could presumably be generalized to deal with these cases. Note that because of the link
between semantic inconsistency and truth and falsehood, the expressivist is under no pressure at all to regard
inconsistencies involving non-assertoric sentences (‘Boo to murder!’) as semantic.
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reference of indexical expressions are transposed. If Frank says, “I am short,” and Lou says,
“That’s true,” Lou does not reassert [I am short]. He reasserts, obviously, that Frank is short.
Analogously, Lou can say without discordance that Frank’s assertion “it is raining, but I
don’t believe it is raining” is true, since what he agrees with is not [it is raining, but I don’t
believe it is raining], but that it is raining, but Frank doesn’t believe it is. Likewise, Frank can
say of himself later, “when I said earlier ‘it it raining, but I don’t believe it is raining,’ what I
said was true,” without expressing any discordance. Again, what Frank is now asserting when
he calls the former statement true is that it was raining, but he did not believe it was raining.
One can agree with a Moore-paradoxical sentence. The inconsistency is only found in certain
uses. But a sentence needn’t be usable to be possibly true; it only need be such that a thirdparty could in principle affirm it as true without thereby expressing discordance.
The expressivist, then, should refine the account of truth we attributed to her in
section 1.1. Sentences are broadly inconsistent just in case a speaker could not sincerely utter
all of them without discordance. But some inconsistencies are pragmatic. The semantic
inconsistencies can be identified as those which are not pragmatic—such as those that remain
inconsistent when claimed true by a third-person speaker or a speaker at a different time or
place.86 This follows from the essential tie between disquotation and truth. So the expressivist
has a principled way of maintaining that the Moore-paradoxical sentence is inconsistent, but
not in a way that rules out the possibility of both conjuncts being true.

3.3. Logical and Illogical Reasoning

86 Note that this states a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition, for semantic inconsistency.
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Logical patterns are not simply realized in language, however. They are realized in our
psychology when we draw inferences, or notice contradictions.87 There is a natural worry,
then, that by tying logic so heavily to the vehicles expressing our thoughts, we have ruled out
any possibility that our thoughts themselves could stand in logical relations. Van Roojen, for
example, writes:

…[S]ince the realist will find a contradiction between ‘Lying is always good,’ and ‘Lying is
not always good,’ the expressivist will want a translation that counts the judgments as
inconsistent in the less stringent expressivist sense. And where two judgments taken in a
realist fashion do not contradict, the expressivist will want there to be no contradiction in the
broader expressivist sense. Still, the expressivist’s sense of contradiction is an extension
beyond the orthodox conception. Attitudes that would not count as contradictory on the latter
account will count as contradictory on the former.88
	
  

Even if the expressivist can draw a line between literal and pragmatic contradiction, doing so
depended on features of how language works. Both forms of contradiction expressed the
same type of underlying discordance. So the attitudes must always contradict each other in
the same way.
Similar concerns are voiced by Zangwill:

…If Blackburn is to imitate the logical structure of realistic thought, he requires that the
contradiction obtains between the propositional attitudes, not just between their contents. For
the moral realist, the two beliefs [X is good] and [X is bad] are logically contradictory. And
the contradiction between the two beliefs obtains because of the contradiction between their
contents. But just because of the difference between attitudes and beliefs, it is difficult to

87 How to exactly characterize this is complicated. Logical relations are not simply “rules of thought,” as we
know from Gilbert Harman, Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Bradford MIT
Press, 1988).
88 “Expressivism and Irrationality,” 330.

42

envisage anything parallel for the projectivist. Those who hooray X and also boo X would be
confused, but there would be no contradiction between their attitudes. Perhaps a confused
person will be in a practical muddle, and that is not a good state to be in. But this is not a
logical evaluation.89
	
  

So for a bit of reasoning to be “logical” requires that the components of such reasoning,
attitudes, stand in logical relations to each other. But only a few such attitudes have the
appropriate logical properties. Notice that Zangwill’s way of stating the objection assumes
that attitudes have logical properties, which strikes us as a category mistake. But in any case,
instances of inferring or reasoning can be logical or not, and an expressivist should be able to
account for this at least.
Van Roojen, Zangwill, and Schroeder all seem to think that the expressivist cannot
solve the Frege-Geach problem until she first explains how attitudes or instances of moral
reasoning are logical. But this objection demands that the expressivist put the cart before the
horse. The only way for expressivists to solve this problem is to solve the Frege-Geach
problem—that is, to demonstrate that she can provide an adequate compositional semantics
for normative terms. Once that problem is solved, solving this one is relatively easy.
Rather than explaining the logical properties of sentences by holding that they inherit
those properties from the attitudes expressed, the expressivist should hold that the logical
properties of the normative attitudes are inherited from the sentences that express them or
that the logical properties of an inference are inherited from the argument that would express
it. That is the whole of the expressivist solution. This may seem like theft over honest toil,
until we look at how realism deals with an analogous problem.
Consider Zangwill’s two sample beliefs [X is good] and [X is bad]. The first thing to
notice is that it is debatable whether these are even logically inconsistent: the inconsistency

89 “Moral Modus Ponens,” 182.
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might be merely metaphysical or semantic. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ are not obviously part of our
logical vocabulary.90 Even if one insists, contra plausibility, that they are, we can still
generate inconsistencies of belief that are non-logical. Assume utilitarianism is true. The
beliefs [X is good] and [X needlessly decreased happiness and increased suffering] have
incompatible truth values, in that case. But they do not logically contradict one another. How
does the realist account for this?
We actually don’t know. But this is well-known to be a difficult problem. If
propositions are just defined in terms of truth values or sets of possible worlds, conflating
metaphysically inconsistent beliefs with logically inconsistent beliefs is hard to avoid. One
(to us) obvious solution is to individuate beliefs, in part, according to their relations to
sentences.91 The beliefs would either be primarily relations to sentences and derivatively to
propositions, or they would be relations to fine-grained propositions partly individuated by
sentences. But this is effectively the solution we’ve suggested for the expressivist; in fact,
given the quasi-realist ambitions of contemporary expressivism, it is likely that these are
simply variations on the same solution.92
Van Roojen notes that the rational relations between attitudes are a broader class than
the logical relations between attitudes, and takes this to be a problem for the expressivist.93 It
is. But the realist faces a parallel problem: relations of entailment among propositions are a
much broader class than the logical entailments between propositions. The natural solution is

90 “…[T]he incompatibility of ‘X is good’ and ‘X is bad’ is analytic, and not logical.” Weintraub, “Logic for
expressivists,” 607. Weintraub also notes that we can extend our logical vocabulary so as to make the
incompatibility (non-classically) logical.
91 For an example of this strategy, see Hartry Field “Mental Representation,” Erkenntnis, 13 (1978): 9-61.
92 Note also that virtually all contemporary forms of expressivism have some quasi-realist ambitions, which
involves giving an account of how we can have cognitive relations to moral contents. Variations of this story
are told by Blackburn, Gibbard, Horgan and Timmons, and Schroeder; it involves using the minimal notion
of truth already appealed to, along with a reductive or minimalist notion of beliefs. Given a minimal notion
of truth as a disquotational and quantificational device, we can give a deflationary notion of propositions.
With this in place, any attitude which is expressed by sentences in the assertoric mode will present a
(deflated) propositional content as true.
93 “Expressivism and Irrationality,” 334.
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the same in both cases. Logical properties are primarily properties of sentences. The logical
properties of other entities, fine-grained propositions, beliefs, other attitudes, and acts of
reasoning, are explained by relations to formal properties of the vehicles of expression, for
the realist as much as the expressivist.

3.4. Brief Summary of the Solution

The expressivist should start by saying that certain combinations of attitudes are discordant—
where this is explicitly not the same as being logically inconsistent. Assertions expressing
discordant attitudes may fail as vehicles of communication due to constraints on
interpretability or they may incur incompatible commitments. Some such failures of
communication are semantic. It is a necessary condition on semantic inconsistency that not
all of the sentences could be true at the same time; hence, inconsistencies are semantic only if
discordance would result for any party asserting their truth or reiterating another’s assertion
of them. Some sentences are such that their assertion expresses discordant attitudes simply in
virtue of their logical vocabulary and other structural features. These are the logically
inconsistent sentences. Reasoning is logical or illogical because of relations the attitudes
involved bear to sentences. An account of how attitudes can be assigned to logically complex
sentences or predicates on the basis of the attitudes assigned to the atomic units must be
given: this is called ‘a solution to the Frege-Geach Problem’. We still need one of those.
At no point should the expressivist attempt to explain why failures of inference are
logical failings independently of her story about the language. Such an explanation cannot be
offered—except perhaps by appealing to an especially discordant form of discord, or
something equally silly and besides the point.
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4. Scorekeeping

We take the one uncontroversial outcome of this discussion to be that there are excellent
examples of B-type discordance and, moreover, that explaining the B-type discordance of
these examples is not significantly different than explaining the A-type discordance of
<inconsistent> beliefs. This is important even outside the expressivist debate: there is a
standard project of explaining rationality (at least partially) in terms of the <consistency>
requirements on the relevant practical or theoretical attitudes. For example, one may try to
reduce practical rationality to decision-theoretic <consistency> of preference.94 If B-type
discordance were a wholly fictitious notion, this project would be impossible. Likewise, Greg
Restall advocates an ambitious project of explaining logical relations in terms of the rational
coherence or incoherence of accepting and rejecting certain packages of claims.95 It would be
surprising if this project failed on the grounds that we must explain discordance of acceptance
and rejection in terms of logical inconsistency.
Another upshot is that the expressivist should distinguish between logical and nonlogical relations between sentences by appeal to their formal properties, rather than by
appealing to special types of psychological conflicts among our attitudes. By itself, this does
not solve the Frege-Geach problem, but it saves the expressivist the challenge of searching
for an especially “logic-like” form of discordance; and it would bring her account of logical
consequence more in-line with standard understandings, rather than saddling her with an
unattractive psychologism, one which has looked especially bad since Harman’s Change in

94 Dreier, “Decision Theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality.”
95 Greg Restall “Multiple Conclusions,” in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the
Twelfth International Congress (London: King’s College Publications, 2005): 189-205.
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View. In other words, she buys herself a less restricted space in which to theorize, at the cost
of making her account of logic look more plausible. The prospects for solving the FregeGeach problem thus increase dramatically.
The other objections to B-type expressivist accounts have to do with specific failings
of those accounts: they invoke an infinite number of primitives, they overgenerate logical
inconsistencies, or they are explanatorily vacuous. These are serious objections, of course;
but even if successful they only show that extant versions of B-type discordance cannot work.
No argument that all B-type accounts must suffer from one of these defects has been
provided. And, if B-type discordance is a theoretically respectable notion, we need such an
argument if the claim that A-type discordance is ‘the only way forward for expressivists’ is to
be justifiable.

5. Conclusion

We have argued that cases of B-type discordance are as familiar as A-type. What’s more, we
have shown that the expressivist has a principled reason to think that B-type discordance
could explain the inconsistency of utterances expressing the B-type-discordant attitudes. The
innovations of Schroeder’s book have expanded the resources of expressivist semantics. And
the objections of Zangwill and Van Roojen have pointed to important lacunae in the
expressivists’ account of logical relations for normative discourse. Such innovation and
criticism is to be welcomed. We see no reason, however, to simultaneously straightjacket the
expressivist project with a single way to analyze <inconsistency> of attitude. And we have
shown that B-type discordance can be utilized to construct an account of logical relations for
normative discourse and that B-type discordance is as amenable to explanation as A-type
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discordance.
This is not to say that problems like the Frege-Geach are trivial for the B-type
expressivist—they are not. But we need to correctly understand the problem. It is the problem
of constructing an extensionally adequate compositional semantics of expression which
predicts correct patterns of truth-preservation in the minimalist/disquotational sense of truth
we’ve adopted above. This is a typical research project for many distinct areas of
contemporary semantics. We see no reason to think that there is any deep tension in
developing the appropriate illocutionary account of expression and specifying attitudetheoretic functions for the logical operators. Nor do we see any trouble in motivating the
notion of B-type discordance itself.
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